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OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
 Petitioners are twenty-eight families – twenty-
eight women and their minor children – who filed habeas 
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petitions in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to prevent, or at least 
postpone, their expedited removal from this country.  
They were ordered expeditiously removed by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to its 
authority under § 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).  Before 
DHS could effect their removal, however, each 
petitioning family indicated a fear of persecution if 
returned to their native country.  Nevertheless, following 
interviews with an asylum officer and subsequent de 
novo review by an immigration judge (IJ), Petitioners’ 
fear of persecution was found to be not credible, such 
that their expedited removal orders became 
administratively final.  Each family then filed a habeas 
petition challenging various issues relating to their 
removal orders.   
 In this appeal we must determine, first, whether the 
District Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of 
Petitioners’ habeas petitions under § 242 of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252.1  Because we hold that the District Court 
does not have jurisdiction under the statute, we must also 
                                                 
1 From this point in this opinion, we will refer to 
provisions of the INA by their location in the United 
States Code.  
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determine whether the statute violates the Suspension 
Clause of the United States Constitution.  This is a very 
difficult question that neither this Court nor the Supreme 
Court has addressed.  We hold that, at least as applied to 
Petitioners and other similarly situated aliens, § 1252 
does not violate the Suspension Clause.  Consequently, 
we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Petitioners’ habeas petitions for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
I.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
 The statutory and regulatory provisions of the 
expedited removal regime are at the heart of this case.  
We will, therefore, provide an overview of the provisions 
which form the framework governing expedited removal 
before further introducing Petitioners and their specific 
claims.  First, we will discuss 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and 
its implementing regulations, which lay out the 
administrative side of the expedited removal regime.  We 
will then turn to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which specifies the 
scope of judicial review of all removal orders, including 
expedited removal orders. 
A.  Section 1225(b)(1)  
 11 
 
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and its companion 
regulations, two classes of aliens are subject to expedited 
removal if an immigration officer determines they are 
inadmissible due to misrepresentation or lack of 
immigration papers: (1) aliens “arriving in the United 
States,” and (2) aliens “encountered within 14 days of 
entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of any 
U.S. international land border.”2  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) & (iii); Designating Aliens for 
Expedited Removal, 69 Fed Reg. 48877-01 (Aug. 11, 
2004).3  If an alien falls into one of these two classes, and 
                                                 
2 Any aliens otherwise falling within these two categories 
but who are inadmissible for reasons other than 
misrepresentation or missing immigration papers are 
referred for regular – i.e., non-expedited – removal 
proceedings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 
3 The statute actually gives the Attorney General the 
unfettered authority to expand this second category of 
aliens to “any or all aliens” that cannot prove that they 
have been physically present in the United States for at 
least the two years immediately preceding the date their 
inadmissibility is determined, regardless of their 
proximity to the border.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).  Although DHS (on behalf of the 
Attorney General) has opted to apply the expedited 
removal regime only to the limited subset of aliens 
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she indicates to the immigration officer that she fears 
persecution or torture if returned to her country, the 
officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an 
asylum officer” to determine if she “has a credible fear of 
persecution [or torture].”   8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) & 
(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d).  The statute defines the 
term “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant 
possibility, taking into account the credibility of the 
statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s 
claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, 
that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under 
section 1158 of this title.”  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); 
see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(3) (“An alien will be found 
to have a credible fear of torture if the alien shows that 
there is a significant possibility that he or she is eligible 
for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under 
the Convention Against Torture.”). 
 Should the interviewing asylum officer determine 
that the alien lacks a credible fear of persecution (i.e., if 
the officer makes a “negative credible fear 
                                                                                                             
described above, it has expressly reserved its authority to 
exercise at a later time “the full nationwide enforcement 
authority of [§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)].”  See Designating 
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed Reg. 48877-01 
(Aug. 11, 2004). 
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determination”), the officer orders the removal of the 
alien “without further hearing or review,” except by an IJ 
as discussed below.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  
The officer is then required to “prepare a written record” 
that must include “a summary of the material facts as 
stated by the applicant, such additional facts (if any) 
relied upon by the officer, and the officer’s analysis of 
why, in the light of such facts, the alien has not 
established a credible fear of persecution.”  Id. § 
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II).  Next, the asylum officer’s 
supervisor reviews and approves the negative credible 
fear determination, after which the order of removal 
becomes “final.”  8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7); id. § 
208.30(e)(7).  Nevertheless, if the alien so requests, she is 
entitled to have an IJ conduct a de novo review of the 
officer’s negative credible fear determination, and “to be 
heard and questioned by the [IJ]” as part of this review.  
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d).  
Assuming the IJ concurs in the asylum officer’s negative 
credible fear determination, “[t]he [IJ]’s decision is final 
and may not be appealed,” and the alien is referred back 
to the asylum officer to effect her removal.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).4 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, if the interviewing asylum officer, or 
the IJ upon de novo review, concludes that the alien 
possesses a credible fear of persecution or torture, the 
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B.  Section 1252 
Section 1252 of Title 8 defines the scope of 
judicial review for all orders of removal.  This statute 
narrowly circumscribes judicial review for expedited 
removal orders issued pursuant to § 1225(b)(1).  It 
provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review 
. . . the application of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens, 
including the [credible fear] determination made under 
[§ 1225(b)(1)(B)].”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
Moreover, except as provided in § 1252(e), the statute 
strips courts of jurisdiction to review: (1) “any individual 
determination or to entertain any other cause or claim 
arising from or relating to the implementation or 
operation of an [expedited removal] order”; (2) “a 
decision by the Attorney General to invoke” the 
expedited removal regime; and (3) the “procedures and 
policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement 
the provisions of [§ 1225(b)(1)].”  Id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i), 
(ii) & (iv).  Thus, the statute makes abundantly clear that 
whatever jurisdiction courts have to review issues 
                                                                                                             
alien is referred for non-expedited removal proceedings 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, “during which time the alien 
may file an application for asylum and withholding of 
removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B). 
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relating to expedited removal orders arises under 
§ 1252(e).  
Section 1252(e), for its part, preserves judicial 
review for only a small subset of issues relating to 
individual expedited removal orders: 
Judicial review of any determination made 
under [§ 1225(b)(1)] is available in habeas 
corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to 
determinations of— 
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien, 
(B) whether the petitioner was 
ordered removed under 
[§ 1225(b)(1)], and 
(C) whether the petitioner can prove 
. . . that the petitioner is [a lawful 
permanent resident], has been 
admitted as a refugee . . . or has been 
granted asylum . . . .  
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Id. § 1252(e)(2).  In reviewing a determination under 
subpart (B) above – i.e., in deciding “whether the 
petitioner was ordered removed under [§ 1225(b)(1)]” – 
“the court’s inquiry shall be limited to whether such an 
order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the 
petitioner.  There shall be no review of whether the alien 
is actually admissible or entitled to any relief from 
removal.”   Id. § 1252(e)(5). 
 Section 1252(e) also provides jurisdiction to the 
district court for the District of Columbia to review 
“[c]hallenges [to the] validity of the [expedited removal] 
system.”  Id. § 1252(e)(3)(A).  Such systemic challenges 
include challenges to the constitutionality of any 
provision of the expedited removal statute or its 
implementing regulations, as well as challenges claiming 
that a given regulation is inconsistent with law.  See id. 
§ 1252(e)(3)(A)(i) & (ii).  Nevertheless, systemic 
challenges must be brought within sixty days after 
implementation of the challenged statute or regulation.  
Id. § 1252(e)(3)(B); see also Am. Immigration Lawyers 
Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 1998), 
aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that “the 
60–day requirement is jurisdictional rather than a 
 17 
 
traditional limitations period”).5  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 Petitioners are natives and citizens of El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala who, over a period of several 
months in late 2015, entered the United States seeking 
refuge.  While their reasons for fleeing their home 
countries vary somewhat, each petitioner claims to have 
been, or to fear becoming, the victim of violence at the 
hands of gangs or former domestic partners.  United 
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents 
                                                 
5 In its brief, as it did during oral argument, the 
government repeatedly argues that many of Petitioners’ 
claims are of a systemic nature and should have been 
brought in the district court for the District of Colombia 
under § 1252(e)(3).  In making this argument, however, 
the government conveniently elides the fact that the 
sixty-day deadline would clearly prevent Petitioners from 
litigating their systemic claims in that forum, because 
that deadline passed years ago. 
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encountered and apprehended each petitioner within 
close proximity to the border and shortly after their 
illegal crossing.  In fact, the vast majority were 
apprehended within an hour or less of entering the 
country, and at distances of less than one mile from the 
border; in all events, no petitioner appears to have been 
present in the country for more than about six hours, and 
none was apprehended more than four miles from the 
border.6  And because none of the petitioners presented 
immigration papers upon their arrest, and none claimed 
to have been previously admitted to the country, they 
clearly fall within the class of aliens to whom the 
expedited removal statute applies.  See Part I.A above. 
 After the CBP agents apprehended them and began 
the expedited removal process, Petitioners each 
expressed a fear of persecution or torture if returned to 
their native country.  Accordingly, each was referred to 
                                                 
6 For reasons explained in detail below, we consider the 
facts regarding Petitioners’ entry and practically-
immediate arrest by immigration enforcement officials to 
be crucial in resolving Petitioners’ Suspension Clause 
argument.  Accordingly, we grant the government’s 
motion for judicial notice as well as its motion to file 
under seal the documents subject to its motion for 
judicial notice.   
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an asylum officer for a credible fear interview.  As part 
of the credible fear interview process, the asylum officers 
filled out and gave to Petitioners a number of forms, 
including a form memorializing the officers’ questions 
and Petitioners’ answers during the interview.  Following 
the interviews – all of which resulted in negative credible 
fear determinations – Petitioners requested and were 
granted de novo review by an IJ.  Because the IJs 
concurred in the asylum officers’ conclusions, Petitioners 
were referred back to DHS for removal without recourse 
to any further administrative review.  Each petitioning 
family then submitted a separate habeas petition to the 
District Court,7 each claiming that the asylum officer and 
IJ conducting their credible fear interview and review 
violated their Fifth Amendment procedural due process 
rights, as well as their rights under the INA, the Foreign 
                                                 
7 Petitioners filed their habeas petitions in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania because they are being detained 
pending their removal at the Berks County Residential 
Center in Leesport, Pennsylvania.  While we are 
uncertain whether venue was proper in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania – § 1252 does not appear to 
indicate where habeas petitions under § 1252(e)(2) 
should be filed – none of the parties has argued that 
venue was improper.  In that venue is non-jurisdictional, 
we need not resolve the issue.  See Bonhometre v. 
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture, the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and the applicable 
implementing regulations.8  All the petitions were 
reassigned to Judge Paul S. Diamond for the limited 
purpose of determining whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists to adjudicate Petitioners’ claims.  
 Petitioners argued before the District Court that 
§ 1252 is ambiguous as to whether the Court could 
review their challenges to the substantive and procedural 
soundness of DHS’s negative credible fear 
determinations.  As such, they argued that the Court 
                                                 
8 Though Petitioners assert on appeal that they each 
raised “a variety” of claims in their habeas petitions, 
Pet’rs’ Br. 33, they specifically point us to only two as 
being uniform across all Petitioners: first, they claim that 
the asylum officers conducting the credible fear 
interviews failed to “prepare a written record” of their 
negative credible fear determinations that included the 
officers’ “analysis of why . . . the alien has not 
established a credible fear of persecution,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II); and second, they claim that the 
officers and the IJs applied a higher standard for 
evaluating the credibility of their fear of persecution than 
is called for in the statute.   
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should construe the statute to allow review of their claims 
in order to avoid “the serious constitutional concerns that 
would arise” otherwise.  JA 19.  The District Court 
roundly rejected this argument, concluding instead that 
§ 1252 unambiguously forecloses judicial review of all of 
Petitioners’ claims, and that to adopt Petitioners’ 
proposed construction would require the Court “to do 
violence to the English language to create an ‘ambiguity’ 
that does not otherwise exist.”  JA 20.   
 Turning then to the Suspension Clause issue, the 
District Court separately analyzed what it termed as 
Petitioners’ “substantive” challenges – those going to the 
ultimate correctness of the negative credible fear 
determinations – versus their challenges relating to the 
procedures DHS followed in making those 
determinations.  Based on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Court 
derived four “factors in determining the scope of an 
alien’s Suspension Clause rights”: “(1) historical 
precedent; (2) separation-of-powers principles; (3) the 
gravity of the petitioner’s challenged liberty deprivation; 
and (4) a balancing of the petitioner’s interest in more 
rigorous administrative and habeas procedures against 
the Government’s interest in expedited proceedings.”  JA 
25 (citations omitted).  Applying these factors, the Court 
determined that the Suspension Clause did not require 
that judicial review be available to address any of 
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Petitioners’ claims, and therefore that § 1252(e) does not 
violate the Suspension Clause.  Thus, the Court 
dismissed with prejudice the consolidated petitions for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Petitioners then filed 
a timely notice of appeal with this Court.9 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 Petitioners challenge on appeal the District Court’s 
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 
§ 1252(e) to review Petitioners’ claims, as well as the 
Court’s conclusion that § 1252(e) does not violate the 
Suspension Clause.  We review de novo the District 
Court’s determination that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.10   Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
                                                 
9 A motions panel of this Court granted Petitioners’ 
motion for stay of removal pending the outcome of this 
appeal, as well as Petitioners’ motion to expedite the 
appeal.  The panel also granted the motions of various 
persons and entities for leave to file amicus briefs in 
support of Petitioners.  The Court thanks amici for their 
valuable contributions in this appeal. 
10 Although the District Court concluded that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions 
accordingly, we nonetheless have jurisdiction under 28 
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Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Petitioners, as the side asserting jurisdiction, “bea[r] the 
burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.”  Nuveen Mun. 
Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. 
WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
A.  Statutory Jurisdiction under § 1252(e) 
 The government contends that § 1252 
unambiguously forecloses judicial review of Petitioners’ 
claims, and that nearly every court to address this or 
similar issues has held that the statute precludes 
challenges related to the expedited removal regime.  
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the statute can 
plausibly be construed to provide jurisdiction over their 
claims, and that, per the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance, the statute should therefore be so construed.  
They also point to precedent purportedly supporting their 
position. 
                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 1291 “to determine [our] own jurisdiction.”  
White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
628 (2002)). 
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 We review pure legal questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 
218, 221 (3d Cir. 2004).  “The first step in interpreting a 
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a 
plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the 
particular dispute in the case.”  Id. at 222 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  If the statute is 
unambiguous, we must go no further.  Roth v. Norfalco 
LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011).  The statute must 
be enforced according to its plain meaning, even if doing 
so may lead to harsh results.  See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 
U.S. 526, 534, 538 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—
is to enforce it according to its terms. . . .  Our 
unwillingness to soften the import of Congress’ chosen 
words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh 
outcome is longstanding.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  Thus, we begin with the statute’s 
plain meaning. 
 As discussed in our overview of the expedited 
removal regime, see Part I.B above, § 1252 makes 
abundantly clear that if jurisdiction exists to review any 
claim related to an expedited removal order, it exists only 
under subsection (e) of the statute.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(A).  And under subsection (e), unless the 
petitioner wishes to challenge the “validity of the 
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system” as a whole rather than as applied to her, the 
district courts’ jurisdiction is limited to three narrow 
issues.  See id. § 1252(e)(2) & (3).  Petitioners in this 
case concede that two of those three issues do not apply 
to them; that is, they concede they are aliens, id. 
§ 1252(e)(2)(A), and that they have not previously been 
lawfully admitted to the country, id. § 1252(e)(2)(C).  
Nevertheless, they argue that their claims fall within the 
third category of issues that courts are authorized to 
entertain: “whether [they have been] ordered removed 
under [§ 1225(b)(1).]”  Id. § 1252(e)(2)(B).   
 At first glance, it is hard to see how this latter grant 
of jurisdiction can be of any help to Petitioners, since 
they do not dispute that an expedited removal order is 
outstanding as to each.  Indeed, their argument seems 
even more untenable in light of § 1252(e)(5), the first 
sentence of which clarifies that when a court must 
“determin[e] whether an alien has been ordered removed 
under [§ 1225(b)(1)], the court’s inquiry shall be limited 
to whether such an order in fact was issued and whether 
it relates to the petitioner.”  Id. § 1252(e)(5).  How could 
the government’s alleged procedural deficiencies in 
ordering the Petitioners’ expedited removal undermine 
the fact that expedited removal orders “in fact w[ere] 
issued” and that these orders “relat[e] to the 
petitioner[s]”?  Id.  
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 Nevertheless, Petitioners argue that the second 
sentence of § 1252(e)(5) creates a strong inference that 
courts have jurisdiction to review claims like theirs.  This 
sentence states, “There shall be no review of whether the 
alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief 
from removal.”  Id.  Petitioners argue that because this 
sentence explicitly prohibits review of only two narrow 
questions, we should read it to implicitly authorize 
review of other questions related to the expedited 
removal order, such as whether the removal order 
resulted from a procedurally erroneous credible fear 
proceeding.  Furthermore, Petitioners argue that the 
government’s proposed construction of § 1252(e)(2)(B) 
and (e)(5) would render the second sentence of 
§ 1252(e)(5) superfluous since the first sentence – which 
would essentially limit courts’ review “only [to] whether 
the agency literally issued the alien a piece of paper 
marked ‘expedited removal,’” Pet’rs’ Br. 15 – would 
already prevent review of the questions foreclosed by the 
second sentence.  Based on these arguments, Petitioners 
claim that the statute is at least ambiguous as to whether 
their claims are reviewable and that we should construe 
the statute in their favor in order to avoid the “serious 
constitutional problems” that may ensue if we read it to 
foreclose habeas review.  Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 
225, 237 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Petitioners are attempting to create ambiguity 
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where none exists.11  Their reading of the second 
sentence in § 1252(e)(5) may be creative, but it 
completely ignores other provisions in the statute – 
including the sentence immediately preceding it – that 
clearly evince Congress’ intent to narrowly circumscribe 
judicial review of issues relating to expedited removal 
orders.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[N]o 
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . the application 
of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens, including the 
[credible fear] determination made under 
[§ 1225(b)(1)(B)].”).   
 As for their argument that the government’s 
construction renders superfluous the second sentence of 
§ 1252(e)(5), we think the better reading is that the 
                                                 
11 And because we conclude that the statute is 
unambiguous, we are unable to employ the canon of 
constitutional avoidance to reach Petitioners’ desired 
result.  See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) 
(“[T]he canon of constitutional doubt permits us to avoid 
[constitutional] questions only where the saving 
construction is not plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.  We cannot press statutory construction to the 
point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a 
constitutional question.” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
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second sentence simply clarifies the narrowness of the 
inquiry under the first sentence, i.e., that “review should 
only be for whether an immigration officer issued that 
piece of paper and whether the Petitioner is the same 
person referred to in that order.”  M.S.P.C. v. U.S. 
Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163-64 
(D.N.M. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-769, 2015 WL 
7454248 (D.N.M. Sept. 23, 2015); see also id. (“Rather 
than being superfluous . . . the second sentence seems to 
clarify that Congress really did mean what it said in the 
first sentence.”); Diaz Rodriguez v. U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot., No. 6:14-CV-2716, 2014 WL 4675182, at 
*2 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2014), vacated as moot sub nom 
Diaz-Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 14-31103, 2014 WL 
10965184 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014) (“The second sentence 
of Section 1252(e)(5) . . . is most fairly interpreted as a 
clarification and attempt by Congress to foreclose narrow 
interpretations of the first sentence of Section 
1252(e)(5).”).12  
                                                 
12 Furthermore, even if our reading of the statute means 
that the second sentence is superfluous, the canon against 
surplusage does not always control and generally should 
not be followed where doing so would render ambiguous 
a statute whose meaning is otherwise plain.  See Lamie, 
540 U.S. at 536 (explaining that “our preference for 
avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute,” and 
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 By reading the INA to foreclose Petitioners’ 
claims, we join the majority of courts that have addressed 
the scope of judicial review under § 1252 in the 
expedited removal context.  See, e.g., Shunaula v. 
Holder, 732 F.3d 143, 145-47 (2d Cir. 2013) (observing 
that § 1252 “provides for limited judicial review of 
expedited removal orders in habeas corpus proceedings” 
but otherwise deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear 
claims related to the implementation or operation of a 
removal order, and holding that an alien’s claims 
disputing that he sought to enter the country through 
fraud or misrepresentation and asserting that he was not 
advised that he was in an expedited removal proceeding 
or given the opportunity to consult with a lawyer “f[ell] 
within this jurisdictional bar”); Brumme v. I.N.S., 275 
F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2001) (characterizing argument 
that courts have jurisdiction under § 1252(e)(2)(B) to 
determine whether the expedited removal statute “was 
applicable in the first place” as an attempt to make “an 
end run around” the “clear” language of § 1252(e)(5)); Li 
v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion 
vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (“With 
respect to review of expedited removal orders, . . . the 
statute could not be much clearer in its intent to restrict 
                                                                                                             
that “applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other 
indications, inappropriate” where applying the rule would 
make ambiguous an otherwise unambiguous statute).   
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habeas review.  Accordingly, only two issues were 
properly before the district court: whether the order 
removing the petitioner was in fact issued, and whether 
the order named [the petitioner].” (citation omitted)); 
Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329-30 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(accord); Diaz Rodriguez, 2014 WL 4675182, at *2 
(rejecting proposed construction similar to Petitioners’ 
argument in this case; “The expedited removal statutes 
are express and unambiguous.  The clarity of the 
language forecloses acrobatic attempts at 
interpretation.”). 
 Petitioners claim that the Ninth Circuit and two 
district courts in other circuits have construed § 1252 to 
allow judicial review of claims that the aliens in question 
had been ordered expeditiously removed in violation of 
the expedited removal statute.  In Smith v. U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, 741 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2014), 
Smith, a Canadian national, was ordered removed under 
§ 1225(b)(1) when, upon presenting himself for 
inspection at the United States-Canada border, the CBP 
agent concluded that he was an intending immigrant 
without proper work-authorization documents.  Smith 
filed a habeas petition under § 1252(e)(2)(B), claiming 
that Canadians are exempt from the documentation 
requirements for admission, which meant that the CBP 
agent exceeded his authority in ordering Smith removed.  
Therefore (Smith’s argument went), he was not “ordered 
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removed under [§ 1225(b)(1)].”  Id. at 1021.   The Ninth 
Circuit “[a]ccept[ed] [Smith’s] theory at face value” only 
to then reject Smith’s argument on the merits.  Id.  
Although the Supreme Court has disapproved of the 
practice, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998), the court 
appears merely to have assumed hypothetical jurisdiction 
in order to dispose of the appeal on easier merits grounds.  
We therefore assign no weight to either Smith’s outcome 
or its reasoning. 
 In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Commission v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003), several Lebanese aliens were ordered 
removed under § 1225(b)(1), years after entering the 
United States using fraudulent documentation.  They 
filed habeas petitions challenging their expedited 
removal orders, and the district court concluded that it 
had jurisdiction “under the circumstances here . . . to 
determine whether the expedited removal statute was 
lawfully applied to petitioners in the first place.”  Id. at 
663.  To support this conclusion, the court latched onto 
the language in § 1252(e)(5) limiting the scope of habeas 
review under § 1252(e)(2)(B) to “whether [the expedited 
removal order] relates to the petitioner,” reasoning that 
an order “relates to” a person only if it was lawfully 
applied to the person.  Id.  We find the court’s 
construction of the statute to be not just unsupported, but 
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also flatly contradicted by the plain language of the 
statute itself.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[N]o 
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . the application 
of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens.” (emphasis 
added)).  Accordingly, we decline to follow it. 
 The last case Petitioners point us to is Dugdale v. 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1 
(D.D.C. 2015).  Dugdale was an alien who had lived for 
extended periods in the United States but who was 
ordered removed pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) after trying to 
return to the country following a visit to Canada.  He 
filed a habeas petition to challenge his removal order 
under § 1252(e)(2).  In his petition he claimed, inter alia, 
that because his removal order was not signed by the 
supervisor of the issuing immigration officer, he was not 
actually “ordered removed” under § 1225(b)(1).  See id. 
at 6.  Addressing this argument, the court recognized that 
the “[c]ase law on this question is scarce.”  Id.  
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded “that a 
determination of whether a removal order ‘in fact was 
issued’ fairly encompasses a claim that the order was not 
lawfully issued due to some procedural defect.”  Id. 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)).  Because the claim that 
the supervisor failed to sign the removal order “f[ell] 
within that category of claims,” id., the court exercised 
its jurisdiction, and ordered further briefing to determine 
if the CBP had complied with its own regulations in 
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issuing his removal order.   
 Even if we were to agree with Dugdale that 
§ 1252(e)(2)(B) encompasses claims alleging “some 
procedural defect” in the expedited removal order, we 
would nonetheless find Petitioners’ claims easily 
distinguishable.  The procedural defect that Dugdale 
alleged was at least arguably related to the question 
whether a removal order “in fact was issued.”  
Petitioners’ claims here, on the other hand, have nothing 
to do with the issuance of the actual removal orders; 
instead, they go to the adequacy of the credible fear 
proceedings.  Furthermore, to treat Petitioners’ claims 
regarding the procedural shortcomings of the credible 
fear determination process as though they were “claim[s] 
that the order was not lawfully issued due to some 
procedural defect” would likely eviscerate the clear 
jurisdiction-limiting provisions of § 1252, for it would 
allow an alien to challenge in court practically any 
perceived shortcoming in the procedures prescribed by 
Congress or employed by the Executive – a result clearly 
at odds with Congress’ intent.  
 In a final effort to dissuade us from adopting the 
government’s proposed reading of the statute, Petitioners 
suggest a variety of presumably undesirable outcomes 
that could stem from it.  For instance, they argue that 
under the government’s reading, a court would lack 
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jurisdiction to review claims that, in ordering the 
expedited removal of an alien, “the government refused 
to provide a credible fear interview, manifestly applied 
the wrong legal standard, outright denied the applicant an 
interpreter, or even refused to permit the applicant to 
testify.”  Pet’rs’ Br. 18; see also Brief for National 
Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 5-21 
(suggesting several other factual scenarios in which 
courts would lack jurisdiction to correct serious 
government violations of expedited removal statute).  To 
this, we can only respond as the Seventh Circuit did in 
Khan when acknowledging some of the possible 
implications of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 
§ 1252: “To say that this [expedited removal] procedure 
is fraught with risk of arbitrary, mistaken, or 
discriminatory behavior . . . is not, however, to say that 
courts are free to disregard jurisdictional limitations.  
They are not . . . .”  608 F.3d at 329.13 
                                                 
13 Of course, even though our construction of § 1252 
means that courts in the future will almost certainly lack 
statutory jurisdiction to review claims that the 
government has committed even more egregious 
violations of the expedited removal statute than those 
alleged by Petitioners, this does not necessarily mean that 
all aliens wishing to raise such claims will be without a 
remedy.  For instance, consider the case of an alien who 
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 For these reasons we agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction under 
§ 1252 to review Petitioners’ claims, and turn now to the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Suspension 
Clause. 
B.  Suspension Clause Challenge 
 The Suspension Clause of the United States 
Constitution states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  
                                                                                                             
has been living continuously for several years in the 
United States before being ordered removed under 
§ 1225(b)(1).  Even though the statute would prevent him 
from seeking judicial review of a claim, say, that he was 
never granted a credible fear interview, under our 
analysis of the Suspension Clause below, the statute 
could very well be unconstitutional as applied to him 
(though we by no means undertake to so hold in this 
opinion).  Suffice it to say, at least some of the arguably 
troubling implications of our reading of § 1252 may be 
tempered by the Constitution’s requirement that habeas 
review be available in some circumstances and for some 
people.  
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  The government does not 
contend that we are in a time of formal suspension.  
Thus, the question is whether § 1252 operates as an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ by stripping 
courts of habeas jurisdiction over all but a few narrow 
questions.  As the party challenging the constitutionality 
of a presumptively constitutional statute, Petitioners bear 
the burden of proof.  Marshall v. Lauriault, 372 F.3d 
175, 185 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 Petitioners argue that the answer to the ultimate 
question presented on appeal – whether § 1252 violates 
the Suspension Clause – can be found without too much 
effort in the Supreme Court’s Suspension Clause 
jurisprudence, especially in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289 (2001), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008), as well as in a series of cases from what has been 
termed the “finality era.”  The government, on the other 
hand, largely views these cases as inapposite, and instead 
focuses our attention on what has been called the 
“plenary power doctrine” and on the Supreme Court 
cases that elucidate it.  The challenge we face is to 
discern the manner in which these seemingly disparate, 
and perhaps even competing, constitutional fields 
interact.  Ultimately, and for the reasons we will explain 
below, we conclude that Congress may, consonant with 
the Constitution, deny habeas review in federal court of 
claims relating to an alien’s application for admission to 
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the country, at least as to aliens who have been denied 
initial entry or who, like Petitioners, were apprehended 
very near the border and, essentially, immediately after 
surreptitious entry into the country. 
 We will begin our discussion with a detailed 
overview of the Supreme Court’s relevant Suspension 
Clause precedents, followed by a summary of the Court’s 
plenary power cases.  We will then explain how we think 
these two areas coalesce in the context of Petitioners’ 
challenges to their expedited removal orders. 
 1.  Suspension Clause Jurisprudence 
 The Supreme Court has held that a statute 
modifying the scope of habeas review is constitutional 
under the Suspension Clause so long as the modified 
scope of review – that is, the habeas substitute – “is 
neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a 
person’s detention.”  Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 
381 (1977) (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 
205, 223 (1952)).  The Court has weighed the adequacy 
and effectiveness of habeas substitutes on only a few 
occasions, and only once, in Boumediene, has it found a 
substitute wanting.  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795 
(holding that “the [Detainee Treatment Act] review 
procedures are an inadequate substitute for habeas 
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corpus,” and therefore striking down under the 
Suspension Clause § 7 of the Military Commissions Act, 
which stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo Bay detainees).  Thus, Boumediene 
represents our only “sum certain” when it comes to 
evaluating the adequacy of a given habeas substitute such 
as § 1252, and even then the decision “leaves open as 
many questions as it settles about the operation of the 
[Suspension] Clause.”  Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 
110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 578 (2010).   
 Before we delve into Boumediene, however, we 
must examine the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr, 
another case on which Petitioners heavily rely.  Although 
the Court in St. Cyr ultimately dodged the Suspension 
Clause question by construing the jurisdiction-stripping 
statute at issue to leave intact courts’ habeas jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the opinion offers insight into 
“what the Suspension Clause might possibly protect.”  
Neuman, supra, at 539 & n.8.   
 St. Cyr was a lawful permanent resident alien who, 
in early 1996, pleaded guilty to a crime that qualified him 
for deportation.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.  Under the 
immigration laws prevailing at the time of his conviction, 
he was eligible for a waiver of deportation at the 
Attorney General’s discretion.  Id.  Nevertheless, by the 
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time he was ordered removed in 1997, Congress had 
enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 110 Stat. 3009–546.  Among the 
myriad other revisions to our immigration laws that these 
enactments effected, AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped the 
Attorney General of his discretionary power to waive 
deportation, and replaced it with the authority to “cancel 
removal” for a narrow class of aliens that did not include 
aliens who, like St. Cyr, had been previously “convicted 
of any aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).  
When St. Cyr applied to the Attorney General for waiver 
of deportation, the Attorney General concluded that 
AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped him of his waiver authority 
even as to aliens who pleaded guilty to the deportable 
offense prior to the statutes’ enactment.  533 U.S. at 297.  
St. Cyr filed a habeas petition in federal district court 
under § 2241, claiming that the provisions of AEDPA 
and IIRIRA eliminating the Attorney General’s waiver 
authority did not apply to aliens who pleaded guilty to a 
deportable offense before their enactment.  Id. at 293.   
 The government contended that AEDPA and 
IIRIRA stripped the courts of habeas jurisdiction to 
review the Attorney General’s determination that he no 
longer had the power to waive St. Cyr’s deportation.  Id. 
at 297-98.  The Court ultimately disagreed with the 
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government, construing the judicial review statutes to 
permit habeas review under § 2241.  To support this 
construction, the Court relied heavily on the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, under which courts are 
“obligated to construe the statute to avoid [serious 
constitutional] problems” if such a saving construction is 
“fairly possible.”14  Id. at 299-300 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  In the Court’s review, the 
government’s proposed construction of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions would have presented “a serious 
Suspension Clause issue.”  Id. at 305.   
 To explain why the Suspension Clause could 
possibly have been violated by a statute stripping the 
courts of habeas jurisdiction under § 2241, the Court 
began with the foundational principle that, “at the 
absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the 
writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’” Id. at 301 (quoting Felker v. 
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).  Looking to the 
Founding era, the Court found evidence that “the writ of 
habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well 
as to citizens” as a means to challenge the “legality of 
Executive detention.”  Id. at 301-02.  In such cases, 
                                                 
14 The Court also relied on “the longstanding rule 
requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to 
repeal habeas jurisdiction.”  533 U.S. at 298. 
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habeas review was available to challenge “detentions 
based on errors of law, including the erroneous 
application or interpretation of statutes.”  Id. at 302.   
 Even while discussing the Founding-era evidence, 
however, the Court in St. Cyr was “careful not to 
foreclose the possibility that the protections of the 
Suspension Clause have expanded along with post–1789 
developments that define the present scope of the writ.”  
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.  Indeed, the Court 
discussed at some length the “historical practice in 
immigration law,” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305, with special 
focus on cases from what may be termed the “finality 
era.”  See id. at 306-07.  In order to understand the role 
that these finality-era cases appear to play in St. Cyr’s 
Suspension Clause analysis, and because Petitioners 
place significant weight on them in their argument that 
§ 1252 violates the Suspension Clause, we will describe 
them in some depth.   
 The finality-era cases came about during an 
approximately sixty-year period when federal 
immigration law rendered final (hence, the “finality” era) 
the Executive’s decisions to admit, exclude, or deport 
aliens.  This period began with the passage of the 
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Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084,15 and 
concluded when Congress enacted the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 
163, which permitted judicial review of deportation 
orders through declaratory judgment actions in federal 
district courts.  See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 
48, 51-52 (1955).16  During this period, and despite the 
                                                 
15 Section 8 of the Act contained the finality provision: 
“All decisions made by the inspection officers or their 
assistants touching the right of any alien to land, when 
adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be 
taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action 
shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.”  Immigration Act of 1891, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 
1085. 
16 Between the 1891 and 1952 Acts, Congress revised the 
immigration laws on several occasions, each time 
maintaining a similar finality provision.  See, e.g., 
Immigration Act of 1907, § 25, 34 Stat. 898, 907 (“[I]n 
every case where an alien is excluded from admission 
into the United States, under any law or treaty now 
existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate 
immigration officers, if adverse to the admission of such 
alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor.”); Immigration Act 
of 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (“In every case where 
any person is ordered deported from the United States 
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statutes’ finality provisions appearing to strip courts of 
all jurisdiction to review the Executive’s immigration-
related determinations, the Supreme Court consistently 
recognized the ability of immigrants to challenge the 
legality of their exclusion or deportation through habeas 
corpus.  Based on this, Petitioners contend that the 
finality-era cases “establishe[d] a constitutional floor for 
judicial review,” Pet’rs’ Br. 26, and that the Suspension 
Clause was the source of this floor.  In making this 
argument, Petitioners rely especially on Heikkila v. 
Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), in which the Court derived 
from its finality-era precedents the principle that the 
statutes’ finality provisions “had the effect of precluding 
judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar 
as it was required by the Constitution.”  Id. at 234-35 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 234 (“During these 
years, the cases continued to recognize that Congress had 
intended to make these administrative decisions 
nonreviewable to the fullest extent possible under the 
Constitution.” (emphasis added; citing Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (“The power to 
exclude or to expel aliens . . . is vested in the political 
departments of the government, and is to be regulated by 
treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the 
executive authority according to the regulations so 
                                                                                                             
under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, 
the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final.”).   
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established, except so far the judicial department . . . is 
required by the paramount law of the constitution, to 
intervene.” (emphasis added)))).   
 Indeed, the Heikkila decision brings us back to St. 
Cyr and helps us understand the significance that the 
Court apparently assigned to the finality-era cases in its 
Suspension Clause discussion.  First, the Court in St. Cyr 
noted that the government’s proposed construction of the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA jurisdiction-stripping provisions 
“would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law 
by any court.”  533 U.S. at 300.  Such a result was 
problematic because, under “[the Suspension] Clause, 
some ‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is 
unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’” Id. 
(quoting Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235).  In short, the Court 
found in the finality-era cases evidence that, as a matter 
of historical practice, aliens facing removal could 
challenge “the Executive’s legal determinations,”17 
                                                 
17 As support for this proposition, the Court also cited 
Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).  See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 306 & n.28.  Gegiow involved Russian immigrants 
whom immigration officers had ordered deported after 
concluding that the aliens were “likely to become public 
charges.”  239 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The immigrants sought and obtained habeas 
review of the Executive’s determination.  According to 
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including “Executive interpretations of the immigration 
laws.”  Id. at 306-07. 
 We turn now to Boumediene.  In Boumediene the 
Court addressed two main, sequential questions.  First, 
the Court considered whether detainees at the United 
States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, “are 
                                                                                                             
the Supreme Court, the only reason the Executive 
provided to support its conclusion that the aliens were 
deportable was that they were not likely to find work in 
the city of their ultimate destination (Portland, Oregon) 
due to the poor conditions of the city’s labor market.  Id. 
at 8-9.  In order to avoid the force of earlier Supreme 
Court precedent holding that “[t]he conclusiveness of the 
decisions of immigration officers under [the prevailing 
immigration statute’s finality provision] is 
conclusiveness upon matters of fact,” id. at 9 (citing 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)), 
the Court presented the question on review as one of law, 
rather than one of fact: “whether an alien can be declared 
likely to become a public charge on the ground that the 
labor market in the city of his immediate destination is 
overstocked.”  Id. at 9-10.  And because the Court 
ultimately concluded that such a consideration was not an 
appropriate grounds for ordering the aliens deported, it 
reversed the order.  Id. at 10. 
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barred from seeking the writ or invoking the protections 
of the Suspension Clause either because of their status . . 
. as enemy combatants, or their physical location . . . at 
Guantanamo Bay.”  553 U.S. at 739.  Then, after 
determining that the detainees were entitled to the 
protections of the Suspension Clause, the Court 
addressed the question “whether the statute stripping 
jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension 
Clause mandate because Congress has provided adequate 
substitute procedures for habeas corpus.”  Id. at 771. 
 In answering the first question regarding the 
detainees’ entitlement vel non to the protections of the 
Suspension Clause, the Court primarily looked to its 
“extraterritoriality” jurisprudence, i.e., its cases 
addressing where and under what circumstances the 
Constitution applies outside the United States.  From 
these precedents the Court developed a multi-factor test 
to determine whether the Guantanamo detainees were 
covered by the Suspension Clause: 
[A]t least three factors are relevant in 
determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; 
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and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the 
writ. 
Id. at 766.  Based on these factors, the Court concluded 
that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at 
Guantanamo Bay.”18  Id. at 771. 
 The Court next considered the adequacy of the 
habeas substitute provided to the detainees by Congress.  
The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) granted jurisdiction 
to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “only to 
assess whether the CSRT [Combat Status Review 
Tribunal19] complied with the ‘standards and procedures 
                                                 
18 While the Court obviously analyzed how these factors 
apply to the Guantanamo detainees in much greater depth 
than our brief summary might suggest, we refrain from 
expositing its analysis further.  That is because, as we 
explain in greater detail below, we think this multi-factor 
test provides little guidance in addressing Petitioners’ 
entitlement to the protections of the Suspension Clause in 
this case. 
19 CSRTs are the military tribunals established by the 
Department of Defense to determine if the Guantanamo 
detainees are “enemy combatants” who are therefore 
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specified by the Secretary of Defense’ and whether those 
standards and procedures are lawful.”  Id. at 777 (quoting 
DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742).  Under the DTA, 
the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction “to inquire into the 
legality of the detention generally.”  Id.  
 In assessing the adequacy of the DTA as a habeas 
substitute, the Court acknowledged the lack of case law 
addressing “standards defining suspension of the writ or 
[the] circumstances under which suspension has 
occurred.”  Id. at 773.  It also made clear that it was not 
“offer[ing] a comprehensive summary of the requisites 
for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.”  Id. at 779.  
Having pronounced these caveats, the Court then began 
its discussion of what features the habeas substitute 
needed to include to avoid violating the Suspension 
Clause.  To begin, the Court recognized what it 
considered to be two “easily identified attributes of any 
constitutionally adequate habeas corpus proceeding,” id.: 
first, the Court “consider[ed] it uncontroversial [ ] that 
the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a 
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being 
held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or 
                                                                                                             
subject to indefinite detention without trial pending the 
duration of the war in Afghanistan.  See 553 U.S. at 733-
34.   
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interpretation’ of relevant law,” id. (quoting St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. at 302); and second, “the habeas court must have the 
power to order the conditional release of an individual 
unlawfully detained,” id.   
 In addition to these two seemingly irreducible 
attributes of a constitutionally adequate habeas substitute, 
the Court identified a few others that, “depending on the 
circumstances, [ ] may be required.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  These additional features include: the ability of 
the prisoner to “controvert facts in the jailer’s return,” see 
id. at 780; “some authority to assess the sufficiency of the 
Government’s evidence against the detainee,” id. at 786; 
and the ability “to introduce exculpatory evidence that 
was either unknown or previously unavailable to the 
prisoner,” id. at 780; see also id. at 786.  To determine 
whether the circumstances in a given case are such that 
the habeas substitute must also encompass these 
additional features, the Court discussed a number of 
considerations, all of which related to the “rigor of any 
earlier proceedings.”  Id. at 781.  In short, the Court 
established a sort of sliding scale whose focus was “the 
sum total of procedural protections afforded to the 
detainee at all stages, direct and collateral.”  Id. at 783. 
 Applying these principles, the Court ultimately 
concluded that the DTA did not provide the detainees an 
adequate habeas substitute.  The Court believed the DTA 
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could be construed to provide most of the attributes 
necessary to make it a “constitutionally adequate 
substitute” for habeas – including the detainees’ ability to 
challenge the CSRT’s legal and factual determinations, 
as well as authority for the court to order the release of 
the detainees if it concluded that detention was not 
justified.  Id. at 787-89.  Nevertheless, the DTA did not 
afford detainees “an opportunity . . . to present relevant 
exculpatory evidence that was not made part of the 
record in the earlier proceedings.”  Id. at 789.  This latter 
deficiency doomed the DTA as a habeas substitute.  
Because of this, the Court held that the Military 
Commissions Act, which stripped federal courts of their 
§ 2241 habeas jurisdiction with respect to the CSRT 
enemy combatant determinations, “effects an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”  Id. at 792. 
 2.  Plenary Power Jurisprudence  
 Against the backdrop of the Court’s most relevant 
Suspension Clause precedents, we direct our attention to 
the plenary power doctrine.  Because the course of this 
doctrine’s development in the Supreme Court sheds 
useful light on the current state of the law, a brief 
historical overview is first in order. 
 The Supreme Court has “long recognized [that] the 
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power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental 
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial 
control.”  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[T]he 
Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been 
legion.”  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-766 & 
n.6 (1972) (collecting cases).  The doctrine first emerged 
in the late nineteenth century in the context of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the first federal statutes to 
regulate immigration.   
 The case that first recognized the political 
branches’ plenary authority to exclude aliens, Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), involved a 
Chinese lawful permanent resident who, prior to 
departing the United States for a trip abroad, had 
obtained a certificate entitling him to reenter the country 
upon his return.  Id. at 581-82.  While he was away, 
however, Congress passed an amendment to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act that rendered such certificates null and 
void.  Id. at 582.  Thus, after immigration authorities 
refused him entrance upon his return, the alien brought a 
habeas petition to challenge the lawfulness of his 
exclusion, arguing that the amendment nullifying his 
reentry certificate was invalid.  Id.  The Court upheld the 
validity of the amendment, reasoning that “[t]he power of 
exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty 
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belonging to the government of the United States as a 
part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 
constitution,” and therefore that “the right to its exercise 
at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the 
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away 
or restrained on behalf of any one.”  Id. at 609; see also 
id. (concluding that questions regarding the political 
soundness of the amendment “are not questions for 
judicial determination”). 
  In subsequent decisions from the same period, the 
Court upheld and even extended its reasoning in Chae 
Chan Ping.  For instance, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), another exclusion (as 
opposed to deportation) case, a Japanese immigrant was 
denied entry to the United States because immigration 
authorities determined that she was “likely to become a 
public charge.”  Id. at 662 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The Court concluded that the statute 
authorizing exclusion on such grounds was valid under 
the sovereign authority of Congress and the Executive to 
control immigration.  Id. at 659 (stating that the power 
over admission and exclusion “belongs to the political 
department[s] of the government”).  In a statement that 
perfectly encapsulates the meaning of the plenary power 
doctrine, the Court declared:  
It is not within the province of the judiciary 
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to order that foreigners who have never been 
naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or 
residence within the United States, nor even 
been admitted into the country pursuant to 
law, shall be permitted to enter, in 
opposition to the constitutional and lawful 
measures of the legislative and executive 
branches of the national government. As to 
such persons, the decisions of executive or 
administrative officers, acting within powers 
expressly conferred by congress, are due 
process of law. 
 
Id. at 660.20 
                                                 
20 While the Court recognized Nishimura Ekiu’s 
“entitle[ment] to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain 
whether the restraint [of her liberty] is lawful,” id. at 660, 
the scope of the Court’s habeas review was limited to 
inquiring whether the immigration officer ordering the 
exclusion “was duly appointed” under the statute and 
whether the officer’s decision to exclude her “was within 
the authority conferred upon him by [the Immigration 
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 The following year, in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court extended the 
plenary power doctrine to deportation cases as well.  
Fong Yue Ting involved several Chinese immigrants who 
were ordered deported pursuant to the Chinese Exclusion 
Act because they lacked certificates of residence and 
could not show by the testimony of “at least one credible 
white witness” that they were lawful residents.  Id. at 
702-04.  The aliens sought to challenge their deportation 
orders, claiming, inter alia, that the Exclusion Act 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id. at 724-25 (citing Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).  As it had done in Chae 
                                                                                                             
Act of 1891].”  Id. at 664.  Thus, Nishimura Ekiu cannot 
help Petitioners because, as we noted above, they have 
conceded that they fall within the class of aliens for 
whom Congress has authorized expedited removal, and 
that the immigration officials ordering their removal are 
duly appointed to do so.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).  That said, it would be a different 
matter were the Executive to attempt to expeditiously 
remove an alien that Congress has not authorized for 
expeditious removal – for example, an alien who claims 
to have been continuously present in the United States for 
over two years prior to her detention.  Such a situation 
might very well implicate the Suspension Clause in a 
way that Petitioners’ expedited removal does not. 
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Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu, the Court declined to 
intervene or review the validity of the immigration 
legislation:  
The question whether, and upon what 
conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to 
remain within the United States being one to 
be determined by the political departments 
of the government, the judicial department 
cannot properly express an opinion upon the 
wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the 
measures enacted by congress in the 
exercise of the powers confided to it by the 
constitution over this subject. 
Id. at 731; see also id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to 
expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, 
or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the 
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute 
and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their 
entrance into the country.”). 
 Thus, the Court’s earliest plenary power decisions 
established a rule leaving essentially no room for judicial 
intervention in immigration matters, a rule that applied 
equally in exclusion as well as deportation cases.   
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 Yet not long after these initial decisions, the Court 
began to walk back the plenary power doctrine in 
significant ways.  In Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 
(1903), a Japanese immigrant was initially allowed to 
enter the country after presenting herself for inspection at 
a port of entry.  Id. at 87.  Nevertheless, just a few days 
later, an immigration officer sought her deportation 
because he had concluded, after some investigation, that 
she “was a pauper and a person likely to become a public 
charge.”  Id.  About a week later, the Secretary of the 
Treasury ordered her deported without notice or hearing.  
Id.  Yamataya then filed a habeas petition in federal 
district court to challenge her deportation, claiming that 
the failure to provide her notice and a hearing violated 
due process.  Id.  The Court acknowledged its plenary 
power precedents, including Nishimura Ekiu and Fong 
Yue Ting, see id. at 97-99, but clarified that these 
precedents did not recognize the authority of immigration 
officials to “disregard the fundamental principles that 
inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time 
of the adoption of the Constitution.”  Id. at 100.  
According to these “fundamental principles,” the Court 
held, no immigration official has the power 
arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered 
the country, and has become subject in all 
respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population, although alleged to be illegally 
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here, to be taken into custody and deported 
without giving him all opportunity to be 
heard upon the questions involving his right 
to be and remain in the United States. 
Id. at 101.21 
 Thus, Yamataya proved to be a “turning point” in 
the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence.  Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1362, 1390 n.85 (1953).  Indeed, as Professor Hart 
explains, it was at this point that the Court “began to see 
that the premise [of the plenary power doctrine] needed 
to be qualified – that a power to lay down general rules, 
even if it were plenary, did not necessarily include a 
                                                 
21 Although the Court recognized the due process rights 
of recent entrants to the country – even entrants who are 
subsequently determined “to be illegally here” – it 
explicitly declined to address whether very recent 
clandestine entrants like Petitioners enjoy such rights.  
See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100.  For obvious reasons, and 
as we explain below, we consider this carve-out in the 
Court’s holding to be of particular importance in 
resolving this appeal. 
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power to be arbitrary or to authorize administrative 
officials to be arbitrary.”  Id. at 1390; see also Charles D. 
Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: 
Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 947-48 & n.62 (1995) 
(discussing Yamataya’s significance to the development 
of the plenary power doctrine).  Yamataya, then, 
essentially gave way to the finality-era cases upon which 
Petitioners and amici place such considerable weight.  
Hart, supra, at 1391 & n.86 (noting the “[t]housands” of 
habeas cases challenging exclusion and deportation 
orders “whose presence in the courts cannot be explained 
on any other basis” than on the reasoning of Yamataya). 
 Nevertheless, Yamataya did not mark the only 
“turning point” in the development of the plenary power 
doctrine.  Nearly fifty years after Yamataya, the Court 
issued two opinions – United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) and Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) – that 
essentially undid the effects of Yamataya, at least for 
aliens “on the threshold of initial entry,” as well as for 
those “assimilated to that status for constitutional 
purposes.”  Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 214 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Hart, 
supra, at 1391-92 (explaining the significance of Knauff 
and Mezei for the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence, 
noting specifically that by these decisions the Court 
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“either ignores or renders obsolete every habeas corpus 
case in the books involving an exclusion proceeding”).   
 In Knauff, the German wife of a United States 
citizen sought admission to the country pursuant to the 
War Brides Act.  338 U.S. at 539 (citing Act of Dec. 28, 
1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1946)).  She was detained 
immediately upon her arrival at Ellis Island, and the 
Attorney General eventually ordered her excluded, 
without a hearing, because “her admission would be 
prejudicial to the interests of the United States.”  Id. at 
539-40.  The Court upheld the Attorney General’s 
decision largely on the basis of pre-Yamataya plenary 
power principles and precedents: 
[T]he decision to admit or to exclude an 
alien may be lawfully placed with the 
President, who may in turn delegate the 
carrying out of this function to a responsible 
executive officer of the sovereign, such as 
the Attorney General.  The action of the 
executive officer under such authority is 
final and conclusive. Whatever the rule may 
be concerning deportation of persons who 
have gained entry into the United States, it is 
not within the province of any court, unless 
expressly authorized by law, to review the 
determination of the political branch of the 
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Government to exclude a given alien. . . .  
Whatever the procedure authorized by 
Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
alien denied entry is concerned. 
Id. at 543-44 (citing, inter alia, Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. 
at 659-60 and Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-14).  Thus, 
with its holding in Knauff, the Court effectively 
“reinvigorated the judicial deference prong of the plenary 
power doctrine.”  Weisselberg, supra, at 956. 
 Similar to Knauff, Mezei involved an alien 
detained on Ellis Island who was denied entry for 
undisclosed national security reasons.  Unlike Knauff, 
however, Mezei had previously lived in the United States 
for many years before leaving the country for a period of 
approximately nineteen months, “apparently to visit his 
dying mother in Rumania [sic].”  345 U.S. at 208.  And 
unlike Knauff, Mezei had no choice but to remain in 
custody indefinitely on Ellis Island, as no other country 
would admit him either.  Id. at 208-09.  In these 
conditions, Mezei brought a habeas petition to challenge 
his exclusion (and attendant indefinite detention).  Id. at 
209.  Nevertheless, the Court again upheld the 
Executive’s decision, essentially for the same reasons 
articulated in Knauff.  “It is true,” the Court explained, 
“that aliens who have once passed through our gates, 
even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings 
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conforming to traditional standards of fairness 
encompassed in due process of law.”  Id. at 212 (citing, 
inter alia, Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01).  In contrast, 
aliens “on the threshold of initial entry stan[d] on 
different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by 
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied 
entry is concerned.’”22  Id. (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 
544). 
 Thus, Knauff and Mezei essentially restored the 
political branches’ plenary power over aliens at the 
border seeking initial admission.  And since these 
decisions, the Court has continued to signal its 
commitment to the full breadth of the plenary power 
                                                 
22 Although Mezei (like Knauff) was indisputably on 
United States soil when he was ordered excluded and 
when he filed his habeas petition, the Court “assimilated” 
Mezei’s status “for constitutional purposes” to that of an 
alien stopped at the border.  See id. at 214 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  This analytical 
maneuver is often referred to as the “entry fiction” or the 
“entry doctrine.”  See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 
969 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 
(1985).  As explained below, the entry fiction plays an 
important, albeit indirect, role in our analysis of 
Petitioners’ Suspension Clause challenge.   
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doctrine, at least as to aliens at the border seeking initial 
admission to the country.23  See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 
(“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress 
more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.  
Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or 
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
                                                 
23 The Court has departed from its reasoning in Knauff 
and Mezei in other respects, including for lawful 
permanent residents seeking reentry at the border, see 
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (holding 
that such aliens are entitled to protections of Due Process 
Clause in exclusion proceedings), as well as for resident 
aliens facing indefinite detention incident to an order of 
deportation following conviction of a deportable offense, 
compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-95 (2001) 
(concluding that resident aliens ordered deported have 
liberty interest under Fifth Amendment in avoiding 
indefinite detention incident to deportation, and 
distinguishing Mezei on grounds that petitioners had 
already entered U.S. before ordered deported), with id. at 
702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Mezei 
controlled question whether aliens ordered deported had 
liberty interest to remain in United States such that they 
are entitled to due process in decision to hold them 
indefinitely, and stating that such aliens have no right to 
release into the United States).  
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exercised by the Government’s political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“This Court has long 
held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United 
States requests a privilege and has no constitutional 
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or 
exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” (citing Knauff, 
338 U.S. at 542; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659-60)).  
3.  Application to Petitioners and the Expedited 
Removal Regime 
 Having introduced the prevailing understandings 
of the Suspension Clause and of the political branches’ 
plenary power over immigration, we now consider the 
relationship between these two areas of legal doctrine 
and how they apply to Petitioners’ claim that the 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252 violate the 
Suspension Clause. 
 Petitioners argue that under the Supreme Court’s 
Suspension Clause jurisprudence – especially St. Cyr and 
the finality-era cases – courts must, at a minimum, be 
able to review the legal conclusions underlying the 
Executive’s negative credible fear determinations, 
including the Executive’s interpretation and application 
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of a statute to undisputed facts.24  And because 
§ 1252(e)(2) does not provide for at least this level of 
review, Petitioners claim that it constitutes an inadequate 
substitute for habeas, in violation of the Suspension 
Clause.   
                                                 
24 Petitioners at times claim that they should also be 
entitled to raise factual challenges due to the “truncated” 
nature of the credible fear determination process.  
Notwithstanding Boumediene’s holding that habeas 
review of factual findings may be required in some 
circumstances, we think Petitioners’ argument is readily 
disposed of based solely on some of the very cases they 
cite to argue that § 1252 violates the Suspension Clause.  
See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306 (noting that in finality-
era habeas challenges to deportation orders “the courts 
generally did not review factual determinations made by 
the Executive”); Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236 (noting that 
“the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus” “has always 
been limited to the enforcement of due process 
requirements,” and not to reviewing the record to 
determine “whether there is substantial evidence to 
support administrative findings of fact”); Gegiow, 239 
U.S. at 9 (“The conclusiveness of the decisions of 
immigration officers under [the finality provision of the 
Immigration Act of 1907] is conclusiveness upon matters 
of fact.”). 
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 The government, on the other hand, claims that the 
plenary power doctrine operates to foreclose Petitioners’ 
Suspension Clause challenge.  In the government’s view, 
Petitioners should be treated no differently from aliens 
“on the threshold of initial entry” who clearly lack 
constitutional due process protections concerning their 
application for admission.  Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.  And 
because Petitioners “have no underlying procedural due 
process rights to vindicate in habeas,” Respondents’ Br. 
49, the government argues that “the scope of habeas 
review is [ ] irrelevant.”  Id.  
 Petitioners raise three principal arguments in 
response to the government’s contentions above.  First, 
they claim that to deny them due process rights despite 
their having indisputably entered the country prior to 
being apprehended would run contrary to numerous 
Supreme Court precedents recognizing the constitutional 
rights of all “persons” within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67, 77 (1976) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment 
applies to all aliens “within the jurisdiction of the United 
States,” including those “whose presence in this country 
is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory”).  Second, they 
argue that even if the Constitution does not impose any 
independent procedural minimums that the Executive 
must satisfy before removing Petitioners, the Executive 
must at least fairly administer those procedures that 
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Congress has actually prescribed in the expedited 
removal statute.  Cf. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238-
39 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation 
proceedings, and explaining that these rights “ste[m] 
from those statutory rights granted by Congress and the 
principle that ‘[m]inimum due process rights attach to 
statutory rights.’” (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 
195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996))).  Third, Petitioners claim that, 
regardless of the extent of their constitutional or statutory 
due process rights, habeas corpus stands as a 
constitutional check against illegal detention by the 
Executive that is separate and apart from the protections 
afforded by the Due Process Clause.   
 We agree with the government that Petitioners’ 
Suspension Clause challenge to § 1252 must fail, though 
we do so for reasons that are somewhat different than 
those urged by the government.  As explained in Part 
III.B.1 above, Boumediene contemplates a two-step 
inquiry whereby courts must first determine whether a 
given habeas petitioner is prohibited from invoking the 
Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner 
or to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or 
detention.  Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739.  Only after 
confirming that the petitioner is not so prohibited may 
courts then turn to the question whether the substitute for 
habeas is adequate and effective to test the legality of the 
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petitioner’s detention (or removal).  As we explain 
below, we conclude that Petitioners cannot clear 
Boumediene’s first hurdle – that of proving their 
entitlement vel non to the protections of the Suspension 
Clause.25   
 The reason Petitioners’ Suspension Clause claim 
falls at step one is because the Supreme Court has 
unequivocally concluded that “an alien seeking initial 
admission to the United States requests a privilege and 
has no constitutional rights regarding his application.” 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.  Petitioners were each 
apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the 
United States, so we think it appropriate to treat them as 
                                                 
25 In evaluating Petitioners’ rights under the Suspension 
Clause, we find Boumediene’s multi-factor test, 
referenced earlier in this opinion, to provide little 
guidance.  As we explain above, the Court derived the 
factors from its extraterritoriality jurisprudence in order 
to assess the reach of the Suspension Clause to a territory 
where the United States is not sovereign.  See 553 U.S. at 
766.  In our case, of course, there is no question that 
Petitioners were apprehended within the sovereign 
territory of the United States; thus, the Boumediene 
factors are of limited utility in determining Petitioners’ 
entitlement to the protections of the Suspension Clause. 
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“alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States.”  
Id.  And since the issues that Petitioners seek to challenge 
all stem from the Executive’s decision to remove them 
from the country, they cannot invoke the Constitution, 
including the Suspension Clause, in an effort to force 
judicial review beyond what Congress has already 
granted them.  As such, we need not reach the second 
question under the Boumediene framework, i.e., whether 
the limited scope of review of expedited removal orders 
under § 1252 is an adequate substitute for traditional 
habeas review.26   
 Petitioners claim that St. Cyr and the finality-era 
cases firmly establish their right to invoke the Suspension 
Clause to challenge their removal orders.27  For two main 
                                                 
26 And because we hold that Petitioners cannot even 
invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge issues related 
to their admission or removal from the country, we have 
no occasion to consider what constitutional or statutory 
due process rights, if any, Petitioners may have.   
27 Petitioners also rely on this Court’s decision in 
Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), which is 
factually and analytically very similar to St. Cyr.  
Because St. Cyr essentially subsumes Sandoval, however, 
our reasons for rejecting St. Cyr’s significance in our 
case apply equally to Sandoval. 
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reasons we think Petitioners’ reliance on these cases is 
flawed.  First, St. Cyr involved a lawful permanent 
resident, a category of aliens (unlike recent clandestine 
entrants) whose entitlement to broad constitutional 
protections is undisputed.  Cf. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.  
Second, as stated earlier, St. Cyr discussed the 
Suspension Clause (and therefore the finality-era cases) 
only to explain what the Clause “might possibly protect,” 
Neuman, supra, at 539 & n.8, not what the Clause most 
certainly protects – and even in this hypothetical posture 
the opinion was non-committal when discussing the 
significance of the finality-era cases to the Suspension 
Clause analysis.  See 533 U.S. at 304 (“St. Cyr’s 
constitutional position finds some support in our prior 
immigration cases . . . .  [T]he ambiguities in the scope of 
the exercise of the writ at common law . . . , and the 
suggestions in this Court’s prior decisions as to the extent 
to which habeas review could be limited consistent with 
the Constitution, convince us that the Suspension Clause 
questions that would be presented by the INS’ reading of 
the immigration statutes before us are difficult and 
significant.” (emphases added; citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. 
at 234-35)).  Indeed, the Court had good reason to tread 
carefully when it came to the meaning of the finality-era 
cases; after all, none of them even mentions the 
Suspension Clause, let alone identifies it as the 
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constitutional provision establishing the minimum 
measure of judicial review required in removal cases.28  
                                                 
28 It was largely for this reason that the District Court 
below declined to assign much weight to the finality-era 
cases in its analysis of Petitioners’ Suspension Clause 
argument.  Petitioners and amici contend that the 
Suspension Clause was the only “logical” constitutional 
provision that the Court in Heikkila could have relied 
upon when explaining that “the Constitution” required a 
certain level of judicial review of immigration decisions.  
See Brief for Scholars of Habeas Corpus Law, Federal 
Courts, and Constitutional Law as Amicus Curiae 12.  
Given the tentative and hypothetical nature of the Court’s 
Suspension Clause analysis in St. Cyr, we too are hesitant 
to extract too much Suspension Clause-related guidance 
from a series of cases whose precise relationship (if any) 
to the Suspension Clause is far from clear.  This is 
especially so in light of Justice Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr 
in which he forcefully critiqued the majority’s reliance 
on the finality-era cases generally and Heikkila 
specifically:  
The Court cites many cases which it says 
establish that it is a “serious and difficult 
constitutional issue” whether the Suspension 
Clause prohibits the elimination of habeas 
jurisdiction effected by IIRIRA.  Every one 
of those cases, however, pertains not to the 
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meaning of the Suspension Clause, but to 
the content of the habeas corpus provision of 
the United States Code, which is quite a 
different matter.  The closest the Court can 
come is a statement in one of those cases to 
the effect that the Immigration Act of 1917 
“had the effect of precluding judicial 
intervention in deportation cases except 
insofar as it was required by the 
Constitution,” Heikkila, 345 U.S., at 234-35.  
That statement (1) was pure dictum, since 
the Court went on to hold that the judicial 
review of petitioner’s deportation order was 
unavailable; (2) does not specify to what 
extent judicial review was “required by the 
Constitution,” which could (as far as the 
Court’s holding was concerned) be zero; 
and, most important of all, (3) does not refer 
to the Suspension Clause, so could well have 
had in mind the due process limitations upon 
the procedures for determining deportability 
that our later cases establish. 
533 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some citations 
omitted).   
Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue in our case, 
for even if St. Cyr definitively established the import of 
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We therefore conclude that St. Cyr and the finality-era 
cases are not controlling here. 
 Another potential criticism of our position – and 
particularly of our decision to treat Petitioners as 
“alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States” 
who are prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause 
– is that it appears to ignore the Supreme Court’s 
precedents suggesting that an alien’s physical presence in 
the country alone flips the switch on constitutional 
protections that are otherwise dormant as to aliens 
outside our borders.   See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 
(“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, 
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to th[e] constitutional 
protection [of the Due Process Clause].”); Zadvydas, 533 
U.S. at 693 (“It is well established that certain 
constitutional protections available to persons inside the 
United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our 
geographic borders.  But once an alien enters the country, 
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process 
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 
                                                                                                             
the finality-era cases to the Suspension Clause, we still 
think the distinction between a lawful permanent resident 
and a very recent surreptitious entrant makes all the 
difference in this case.  More on this below.  
 73 
 
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” (citations omitted)); 
see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); 
Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01; Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; 
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).  Again, this 
criticism is misplaced for two principal reasons.   
 First, and perhaps most fundamentally, most of the 
cases cited above did not involve aliens who were 
seeking initial entry to the country or who were 
apprehended immediately after entry.  See, e.g., Yick Wo, 
118 U.S. at 358 (long-time resident alien); Mathews, 426 
U.S. at 69 (lawfully admitted resident aliens); Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 206 (undocumented resident aliens); Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. at 684-85 (long-time resident aliens).  And as 
for the cases that did involve arriving aliens, the Court 
rejected the aliens’ efforts to invoke additional 
protections based merely on their presence in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.29  See Mezei, 
                                                 
29 Petitioners make much of the fact that the Court 
extended constitutional due process protections to the 
alien in Yamataya despite her short stint in the United 
States.  See 189 U.S. at 87, 100-01.  Petitioners’ reliance 
on this case ignores other language in the opinion clearly 
distinguishing Yamataya – an alien who was initially 
admitted to the country and who “ha[d] become . . . a part 
of its population” before being ordered deported, id. at 
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345 U.S. at 207 (former resident alien held on Ellis 
Island seeking readmission after extended absence); Leng 
May Ma, 357 U.S. at 186 (arriving alien allowed into the 
country on parole pending admission determination).  
Thus, Petitioners can draw little support from these latter 
cases. 
 Second, the Supreme Court has suggested in 
several other opinions that recent clandestine entrants 
like Petitioners do not qualify for constitutional 
protections based merely on their physical presence 
alone.  See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100-01 (withholding 
judgment on question “whether an alien can rightfully 
invoke the due process clause of the Constitution who 
has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been 
here for too brief a period to have become, in any real 
sense, a part of our population, before his right to remain 
is disputed”); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 
49-50 (1950) (“It was under compulsion of the 
Constitution that this Court long ago held [in Yamataya] 
                                                                                                             
101 – from very recent clandestine entrants like 
Petitioners, see id. at 100.  Thus, while Yamataya might 
apply in some future case where the alien ordered 
removed has been in the country for a period of time 
sufficient “to have become, in [some] real sense, a part of 
our population,” id., that simply is not this case. 
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that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a 
hearing at least for aliens who had not entered 
clandestinely and who had been here some time even if 
illegally.” (emphasis added)); Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (“The Bill of 
Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission 
for the first time to these shores.  But once an alien 
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to 
all people within our borders.” (emphasis added)); 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains 
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties 
that go with permanent residence his constitutional status 
changes accordingly.” (emphasis added)); United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (stating 
in dicta that “aliens receive constitutional protections 
when they have come within the territory of the United 
States and developed substantial connections with this 
country” (emphasis added)).  At a minimum, we 
conclude that all of these cases call into serious question 
the proposition that even the slightest entrance into this 
country triggers constitutional protections that are 
otherwise unavailable to the alien outside its borders.  
Such a proposition is further weakened by the Court’s 
adoption of the “entry fiction” to deny due process rights 
to aliens even though they are unquestionably within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  In other 
words, if entitlement to constitutional protections turned 
entirely on an alien’s position relative to such a rigid 
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conception as a line on a map, then the Court’s entry-
fiction cases such as Mezei would run just as contrary to 
this principle as our holding in this case does.30 
 We thus conclude that, as recent surreptitious 
entrants deemed to be “alien[s] seeking initial admission 
to the United States,” Petitioners are unable to invoke the 
Suspension Clause, despite their having effected a brief 
entrance into the country prior to being apprehended for 
removal.31 
                                                 
30 This is not to say that an alien’s location relative to the 
border is irrelevant to a determination of his rights under 
the Constitution.  Indeed, we think physical presence is a 
factor courts should consider; we simply leave it to courts 
in the future to evaluate the Suspension Clause rights of 
an alien whose presence in the United States goes 
meaningfully beyond that of Petitioners here.  
31 In addition to the above, it is worth noting that when 
the Court in Landon stated that certain aliens lack 
constitutional rights regarding their application for 
admission, it did not categorize aliens based on whether 
they have entered the country or not; rather, the Court 
focused (as IIRIRA and the expedited removal regime 
focus) on whether the aliens are “seeking initial 
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admission to the United States.”  Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) 
(conditioning aliens’ eligibility for expedited removal, in 
part, on inadmissibility, even if aliens are physically 
present in the United States).  Arguably, this suggests 
that, at least in some circumstances, an alien’s mere 
physical presence in the country is of little constitutional 
significance unless that alien has previously applied for 
and been granted admission.  See David A. Martin, Two 
Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration 
Laws, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 673, 689 n.55 (2000) (arguing 
that “by emphasizing admission over entry, [Landon] 
may give more weight to” the constitutional significance 
of IIRIRA’s focus on aliens’ admissibility rather than 
physical location).  Then again, Landon relied on Knauff 
to support its statement that “an alien seeking initial 
admission . . . has no constitutional rights regarding his 
application.”  See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (citing, inter 
alia, Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542).  And since Knauff focused 
on whether the alien had “entered” the country, “initial 
admission” in Landon may simply be synonymous with 
“initial entry.”  At all events, our opinion should not be 
read to place tremendous weight on this possible 
distinction. 
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 Our holding rejecting Petitioners’ Suspension 
Clause claims is true to the arc traced by the Supreme 
Court’s plenary power cases in recent decades.  It is also 
consistent with the Court’s analytical framework for 
evaluating Suspension Clause challenges.  Even if 
Petitioners would be entitled to constitutional habeas 
under the finality-era cases, those cases, as explained 
above, no longer represent the prevailing view of the 
plenary power doctrine, at least when it comes to aliens 
seeking initial admission.  Instead, we must look to 
Knauff, Mezei, and other cases reaffirming those sea-
changing precedents, all of which point to the conclusion 
that aliens seeking initial admission to the country – as 
well as those rightfully assimilated to that status on 
account of their very recent surreptitious entry – are 
prohibited from invoking the protections of the 
Suspension Clause in order to challenge issues relating to 
their application for admission.32   
                                                 
32 Of course, as we recognized above, this is not to say 
that the political branches’ power over immigration is 
limitless in all respects.  We doubt, for example, that 
Congress could authorize, or that the Executive could 
engage in, the indefinite, hearingless detention of an alien 
simply because the alien was apprehended shortly after 
clandestine entrance.  Cf. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 
(noting that the question before the Court – “whether 
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aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove 
are to be condemned to an indefinite term of 
imprisonment within the United States” – does not 
implicate questions regarding “the political branches’ 
authority to control entry into the United States”).  And 
we are certain that this “plenary power” does not mean 
Congress or the Executive can subject recent clandestine 
entrants or other arriving aliens to inhumane treatment.  
Cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 
(1896) (noting that “[n]o limits can be put by the courts 
upon the power of congress to protect, by summary 
methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose 
race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to 
expel such if they have already found their way into our 
land, and unlawfully remain therein,” but distinguishing 
such valid exercises of power from a law allowing the 
Executive to subject deportable aliens to hard labor 
without a jury trial); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (noting the difference between the rights of 
aliens not to be tortured or “subjected to the punishment 
of hard labor without a judicial trial” and the right to 
remain in the country after being deemed deportable); 
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“The ‘entry fiction’ that excludable aliens are to be 
treated as if detained at the border despite their physical 
presence in the United States determines the aliens’ 
rights with regard to immigration and deportation 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 We are sympathetic to the plight of Petitioners and 
other aliens who have come to this country seeking 
protection and repose from dangers that they sincerely 
believe their own governments are unable or unwilling to 
address.  Nevertheless, Congress has unambiguously 
limited the scope of judicial review, and in so doing has 
foreclosed review of Petitioners’ claims.  And in light of 
the undisputed facts surrounding Petitioners’ 
surreptitious entry into this country, and considering 
Congress’ and the Executive’s plenary power over 
decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of aliens, 
we cannot say that this limited scope of review is 
unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause, at least as 
to Petitioners and other aliens similarly situated.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Petitioners’ habeas petitions for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
proceedings.  It does not limit the right of excludable 
aliens detained within United States territory to humane 
treatment.” (footnote omitted)).  But to say that the 
political branches’ power over immigration is subject to 
important limits in some contexts by no means requires 
that the exercise of that power must be subject to judicial 
review in all contexts. 
  
Rosa Elida Castro et al. v. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, No. 16-1339 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring dubitante.  
 I join Judge Smith’s excellent opinion in full, but I 
write separately to express my doubt that the expression 
of the plenary power doctrine in Landon v. Plasencia 
completely resolves step one of the Suspension Clause 
analysis under Boumediene. Although Landon appears to 
preclude “alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United 
States” from invoking any constitutional protections 
“regarding [their] application[s],” the question of what 
constitutional rights such aliens are afforded was not 
squarely before the Supreme Court in that case because 
the petitioner was a returning permanent resident. 459 
U.S. 21, 23, 32 (1982). Nor did the Court in Landon 
purport to resolve a jurisdictional question raising the 
possibility of an unconstitutional suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus.1 
                                                 
 1 Landon may also be at odds with the proposition 
that “the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it 
existed in 1789.’”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 
(2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 
(1996)); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 
(2008). See generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward 
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 
Context, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 
675–76 (2008) (“A sample of newspapers from the 1780s 
provides four instances of the use of the writ by slaves in 
2 
 
 Despite my uncertainty about Landon’s dispositive 
application here, I am convinced that we would reach the 
same result under step two of Boumediene’s framework. 
Unlike the petitioners in Boumediene—who sought their 
release in the face of indefinite detention—Petitioners 
here seek to alter their status in the United States in the 
hope of avoiding release to their homelands. That prayer 
for relief, in my view, dooms the merits of their 
Suspension Clause argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) 
provides an “inadequate or ineffective” habeas substitute. 
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952). 
                                                                                                             
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. 
These suggest that the use of the writ was not confined to 
native-born British-American citizens of European 
ancestry, and that American usage was paralleling that in 
England and its colonies. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
that Americans were not aware of reports of the decision 
in Somerset’s Case of 1772, in which Chief Justice 
Mansfield ruled that a slave in England could not be held 
in custody.”). 
